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I. POLICY INTERPRETATION
In Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.,'
Justice Hall provides a good review of the rules for interpretation of insurance
policies.' In addition to application of the Louisiana Civil Code provisions for
contractual interpretation, the court also utilized the "reasonable expectations
doctrine," which seeks to resolve ambiguity "by ascertaining how a reasonable
insurance purchaser would construe the clause at the time the contract was
entered."3 The supreme court faced the issue whether an excess policy "dropped
down" to provide primary coverage upon the insolvency of the primary insurer.
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Adjunct Professors of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 630 So. 2d 759 (La. 1994).
2. His review may be summarized as follows:
[First,] an insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed by
using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Civil Code. The
judicial responsibility in interpreting insurance contracts is to determine the parties'
common intent.
[Second,] the parties' intent as reflected by the words in the policy determine the extent
of coverage....
[Third,] an insurance policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or a strained
manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplat-
ed by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Absent a conflict with statutory
provisions or public policy, insurers, like other individuals, are entitled to limit their
liability and to impose and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations
they contractually assume.
[Fourth,] ambiguity in an insurance policy must be resolved by construing the policy as
a whole; one policy provision is not to be construed separately at the expense of
disregarding other policy provisions.
[Fifth,] if after applying the other general rules of construction an ambiguity remains,
the ambiguous contractual provision is to be construed against the drafter, or, as
originating in the insurance context, in favor of the insured. This rule of strict
construction requires that ambiguous policy provisions be construed against the insurer
who issued the policy and in favor of coverage to the insured.
[Sixth,) "ambiguity will also be resolved by ascertaining how a reasonable insurance
policy purchaser would construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was
entered." In insurance parlance, this is labeled the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Id. at 763-64 (quoting Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 610-11 (La. 1989)) (citations omitted)
(footnotes omitted). Regarding the notion that the parties' intent determines the extent of the
coverage, the court also said: "[lIf the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously expresses
the parties' intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written." id. at 764.
3. Id. The supreme court considered the reasonable expectations doctrine in a number of recent
decisions. See Yount v. Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148, 153 (La. 1993); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard,
608 So. 2d 981. 985-86 (La. 1992); Breland, 550 So. 2d at 610-11.
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Previously, the court in Kelly v. Weil,4 found the provisions of most excess
policies fall into one of three categories, which determine whether the policy
drops down. The Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. policy, however, did not fit
neatly into any of the Kelly categories. The policy contained provisions that had
been construed in Kelly as preventing drop-down coverage. LIGA contended,
however, that an additional provision created ambiguity, which should be
construed in favor of coverage. The supreme court disagreed, finding the
additional provision was not ambiguous when read in context and the insured did
not have a reasonable expectation that excess coverage would drop down.
II. WAIVER
Steptore v. Masco Construction Co.5 recognizes that an insurer waives a
coverage defense when the insurer unconditionally undertakes the defense of the
insured with knowledge of that coverage defense. The policy in Steptore covered
a crane barge and contained a navigation warranty that the barge was to be
located at certain facilities in St. John the Baptist Parish. With knowledge that
the accident occurred in Ascension Parish, the insurer engaged a single law firm
to defend both the insured and the insurer. Six months later, the insurer denied
coverage for breach of the navigation warranty. The law firm withdrew as
counsel for the insured but continued to represent the insurer.6
The supreme court held the insurer had waived the coverage defense of the
navigation warranty breach. The court observed that waiver is "the intentional
relinquishment of a known right, power or privilege," which "occurs when there
is an existing right, a knowledge of its existence and an actual intention to
relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as to
induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished."7 The court further
emphasized that waiver principles should be "applied stringently"8 to avoid
conflicts of interest that potentially divide the loyalty of the legal representative
of the insured. The court then ruled that, "when an insurer, with knowledge of
facts indicating noncoyerage under the insurance policy, assumes or continues the
insured's defense without obtaining a nonwaiver agreement to reserve its
coverage defense, the insurer waives such policy defense."9
4. 563 So. 2d 221 (La. 1990).
5. 643 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1994).
6. Id. at 1214-15. While the trial court found waiver, the court of appeal reversed with the
observation that the insurer was not attempting "to spring the trap of late notice upon its unsuspecting
insured." Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 619 So. 2d 1183, 1187 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
7. Steptore, 643 So. 2d at 1216. The court also pointed out that "waiver may apply to any
provision of an insurance contract, even though this may have the effect of bringing within coverage
risks originally excluded or not covered." Id. In some jurisdictions, the doctrine of waiver cannot
be used to extend coverage to additional risks. See, e.g., Gilley v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 17 F.3d
775 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Mississippi law).
8. Steptore, 643 So. 2d at 1216.
9. Id. Two justices' concurred. Justice Ortique observed it was unnecessary for the court to
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The court did not discuss what constitutes a "nonwaiver agreement."
Presumably, the court is not requiring a written instrument executed by both
parties. A written communication from the insurer to the insured should be
sufficient when it gives notice that the insurer, while willing to undertake the
defense of the insured, reserves its right to assert coverage defenses. If the
insured then accepts defense by the insurer, the insured does so with knowledge
of the potential conflict of interest and with the implicit agreement that the
insurer has reserved its coverage defenses.
To support its finding of waiver, the court in Steptore pointed out that the
insurer had not engaged separate counsel for the insured.'" When the insurer
has reserved coverage defenses, it is improper for the same attorney, with or
without consent, to represent both the insured and the insurer." The duty to
defend includes the responsibility of providing separate representation for .the
insured when the insurer has coverage defenses."2
Under different factual circumstances, two recent federal Fifth Circuit
decisions, applying Louisiana law, also found that insurers had waived certain
rights.13
consider the application of waiver principles to the insurer's defense of the action because the
insurer's pattern of retroactive waiver of the navigation warranty alone was sufficient to constitute
waiver of that coverage defense. Id. at 1219-20 (Ortique, J., concurring). The decision represents
a new application of waiver by the supreme court, although the same application was made as
Louisiana law in Peavey Co. v. M/V Anpa, 971 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1992). and in Foret v.
Terrebonne Towing Co., 632 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1067 (1994).
Other recent cases have not found waiver. See, e.g., Graham Resources, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
625 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 631 So. 2d 1164 (1994) (rejecting the insured's
contention that certain actions not described in the opinion constituted an admission of the duty to
defend, and holding that waiver and estoppel could not be used to extend coverage to a risk not
included in the policy); Farm Credit Bank v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 822 F. Supp. 1251, 1255
(W.D. La. 1993) (holding the insurer's "mildly ambiguous" conduct did not constitute waiver of two-
year limitation on filing suit).
10. Steptore, 643 So. 2d at 1217.
11. Opinion 342 of the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
(1974). Opinion 342 was approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court in In re Louisiana Ass'n of
Defense Counsel, 338 So. 2d 294 (La. 1976):
12. Dugas Pest Control of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co.. 504 So.
2d 1051 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
13. In Home Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 998 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1993), the insured, later convicted of
felony theft of clients' funds and disbarred, denied in his application for a legal malpractice policy
any knowledge of circumstances that could result in a claim. In his renewal application, however,
he listed 16 settlement disputes with clients. The insurer refused to renew the policy, but permitted
the insured to purchase a 36 month extended reporting period. Thereafter, the insurer sought a
declaratory judgment that the policy, including the extended reporting period, was void for
misrepresentation in the original application. Id. at 307. The court held the renewal application gave
the insurer sufficient knowledge of the insured's misrepresentation, which could have been confirmed
by prompt investigation. By accepting premiums almost three months later, the insurer waived its
defense under the rule that "acceptance of premium payments by an insurer after receiving knowledge
of facts creating a power of avoidance or privilege of forfeiture constitutes a waiver of such power
or privilege." Id. at 309-10 (quoting Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr., Comment, Waiver and Estoppel in
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III. DUTY TO DEFEND
Recent cases hold that if the petition states one claim within the policy's
coverage, the insurer has the duty to defend the entire lawsuit, even the claims
for which there is no insurance coverage.'" In Rivnor Properties v. Herbert
O'Donnell, Inc.,'5 the court approved a policy that included defense costs within
the policy limits. The insurer had expended $240,000 of the $250,000 policy
limits for defense costs.' 6 In Steptore, the court held that the insurer's breach
of the duty to defend the insured rendered the insurer liable for defense costs, but
the insured could not recover the expense of litigating the duty to defend and
other coverage issues with the insurer.
1 7
Louisiana Insurance Law, 22 La. L. Rev. 202, 204 (1961)). Steptore also recognized that "notice
of facts which would cause a reasonable person to inquire further imposes a duty of investigation
upon the insurer, and failure to investigate constitutes waiver of all powers and privileges which a
reasonable search would have uncovered." Steptore, 643 So. 2d at 1216.
In Riley Stoker Corp. v. Fidelity & Guar. Underwriters, Inc., 26 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1994), the
insurer denied coverage on a basis unrelated to notice and then attempted to assert delayed notice as
a defense in its amended answer. Relying on Wheeler v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 180 La.
366, 156 So. 420 (1934), the court held the insurer had waived its notice defense. Riley Stoker
Corp., 26 F.3d at 585. But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1212 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding a notice defense first asserted in an answer was not waived).
14. Dennis v. Finish Line, Inc., 636 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Treadway v. Vaughn,
633 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 233 (1994); Ellis v. Transcontinental Ins.
Co., 619 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 625 So. 2d 1043 (1993). See Yount v.
Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148 (La. 1993) (holding although coverage for the judgment against the insured
was barred by the intentional injury exclusion, the insurer was liable for the insured's defense costs
because the plaintiff's petition had not unambiguously excluded coverage). See also Riley Stoker
Corp. v. Fidelity & Ouar. Underwriters, Inc., 26 F.3d 581 (5th Cir, 1994); Alert Centre, Inc. v. Alarm
Protection Serv., Inc., 967 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992). In Riley Stoker Corp., 26 F.3d at 590, the court
specifically rejected the insurer's assertion that defense costs should be allocated between covered
and noncovered claims. Cf. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metal & Minerals
Corp., 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law, said to be the same as Louisiana law, and
holding that insurers providing successive coverage in latent-injury toxic-exposure cases have an
absolute duty to defend, but need not provide separate defenses; instead, the insurers may be
compelled by the insured to share the defense costs pro rata, based on time each policy was exposed
to the risk alleged in the complaint). In Federal Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 638 So.
2d 1132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994), the court agreed an insurer has the duty to defend the entire suit,
but found the policy in question did not obligate the insurer to defend the action. Instead, the insurer
was obligated only to indemnify the insured for defense costs. Relying on Meloy v. Conoco, Inc.,
504 So. 2d 833 (La.'1987), the court held the duty to indemnify is determined by the outcome of the
litigation, rather than by the allegations of the petition which govern the duty to defend under an
insurance policy. Federal Ins. Co., 638 So. 2d at 1136-38.
15. 633 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writs denied, 643 So. 2d 147, 147 (1994).
16. The court left open the possibility that the circumstances of the particular policy may be
examined, stating it saw "no reason why an insurer cannot include a claims expense deduction
provision in its insurance contract where the insured is sufficiently sophisticated to understand the
significance and consequences of the provision." id. at 755. In Rivnor Properties, the court was
examining a professional liability policy issued to an architect.
17. Steptore, 643 So. 2d at 1217-18. After the insurer denied coverage and withdrew from
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IV. BODILY INJURY DAMAGES
In Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co.,18 the plaintiff's wife had
witnessed her husband's severe injuries when his motorcycle collided with an
oncoming car. The wife brought a Lejuene claim under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.6, which permits spouses to recover for "severe, debilitating and
foreseeable mental anguish or emotional distress." State Farm's uninsured
motorist coverage for the husband and wife was written with "split limits" of
$25,000 "for all damages due to bodily injury to one person" and $50,000 "for
all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident."
The policy further provided that "'[blodily injury to one person' includes all
injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.' 9 State Farm
contended the "bodily injury to one person" limit was applicable to all damages
suffered by the husband and wife. From its interpretation of the policy, however,
the supreme court concluded the wife's Lejuene claim was a separate bodily
injury sustained in the same accident for which an additional $25,000 coverage
was available. 20
The court found it unnecessary to decide whether a Lejuene claim "results
from" the other tort victim's bodily injuries. Instead, it found the policy
definition of "bodily injury to one person" as including "all injuries and damages
to others" to be ambiguous and not to include "bodily injury" to another person
sustained in the same accident. The court then found the policy defini-
tion-"bodily injury is bodily injury to a person, and sickness, disease or death
which results from it"-to be ambiguous because it was circular and was not
expressly limited to physical injuries. After examining several earlier cases
finding emotional damages to be "bodily injury," the court concluded the severe
and debilitating emotional injury necessary to support a Lejuene claim was
"bodily injury" within the meaning of the policy." The court further found the
defense of the insured, counsel retained by the insured filed a third party demand against the insurer
for defense costs and indemnity under the insurance policy.
18. 632 So. 2d 736 (La. 1994).
19. Id. at 739. The relevant portion of the policy read in full:
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations page under
"Limits of Liability-Coverage A-Bodily Injury, Each Person, Each Accident." Under
"Each Person" is the amount of coverage ($25,000] for all damages due to bodily injury
to one person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury and damages to others
resulting from this bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage
[$50.0001. subject to the amount shown under "Each Person." for all damages due to
bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident.
Id.
20. Id. at 742.
21. Id. at 743-45. Cf. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holloway, 17 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1994). In a civil
action arising out of the "Por Pom Mom" case, the insured allegedly plotted to kill the mother of
a girl competing with her daughter for the same junior high school cheerleading position. The
complaint alleged that the intended victim suffered "extreme pain, suffering, emotional anguish, and
emotional trauma" and that the other members of her family had been deprived of a "sense of
1995]
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wife's "bodily injury" was suffered in the same accident, entitling her to a
separate per-person limit.22
In Crabtree, the parties had stipulated that the wife's loss of consortium
claim would be paid out of the husband's limit, a stipulation consistent with
earlier decisions of the courts of appeal.23 While noting this jurisprudence, the
supreme court stated it was not "passing on the propriety" of the loss of
consortium decisions.' If Crabtree troubles the insurance industry, then policy
revision dealing specifically with emotional injury may be the most effective way
to relieve the anxiety. However, care should be taken to consider the extent to
which policies should provide protection for emotional injury, under UM and all
forms of liability coverage.
V. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
25
By statute, uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is required in any policy
providing automobile liability insurance, unless the insured effectively rejects
such coverage. 26 In Washington v. Savoie,27 a three-year policy was issued to
the Orleans Parish School Board on November 15, 1984. Later discovering the
failure to reject UM coverage, an authorized representative of the school board
signed a rejection on May 6, 1985. That rejection mistakenly stated its effective
date as November 15, 1985, instead of the 1984 inception date of the policy. To
avoid uninsured motorist coverage for four accidents that occurred between May
6, 1985, and November 15, 1985, the school board and its insurer sought to
reform the rejection to express their mutual intent.28  The supreme court in
security and well-being." Id. at 115. Applying Texas law, the court held the insurer had no duty to
defend the Por Por Morn because the "nonphysical injuries" asserted by the plaintiffs were not
"bodily injury" within the policy's coverage. Id.
22. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 742.
23. Sandoz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 620 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Sharff
v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 589 So. 2d 1055 (1991);
Shepard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 545 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 550 So.
2d 627, 628 (1989); Carroll v. State Farm Ins. Co., 519 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
520 So. 2d 756 (1988).
24. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 744.
25. La. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1994).
26. For discussion of mandatory coverage and the requirements for an effective waiver, see
Tugwell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 609 So. 2d 195 (La. 1992). See also W. Shelby McKenzie & H.
Alston Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 102-105, at 218-26, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (1986).
27. 634 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1994).
28. Id. at 1178. Prior jurisprtdence permitted a waiver of coverage to be executed subsequent
to the issuance of the policy, but the waiver could not be retroactive to the prejudice of an insured
whose cause of action arose prior to the waiver's execution. See, e.g., Alford v. Woods, 614 So. 2d
1299 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 915 (1993); Randazzo v. Segura, 514 So. 2d 469
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Alexander v. Allstate Ins. Co., 493 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
In Futch v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1993), the plurality opinion suggests
the waiver must be contemporaneous with application or issuance of the policy. This statement was
INSURANCE
Washington emphasized the strong public policy concerns underlying uninsured
motorist coverage and held the rejection could not be reformed to correct its
effective date to the prejudice of claims that arose prior to reformation.29
VI. CARE, CUSTODY, OR CONTROL ExcLusION
In Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd.,3° the plaintiff leased a self-storage
unit from which his personal property was stolen. He filed suit against the
owner and manager of the unit, who then filed a third party demand against their
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurer. The CGL policy excluded
coverage for property damage to "personal property in your care, custody or
control.' The supreme court held the exclusion was not applicable. The
jurisprudence recognizes two distinct circumstances under which the exclusion
is applied: (1) the insured has actual physical possession of or control over the
property, such as a contractor while performing work on property; and (2) the
insured has a proprietary interest in and derives a monetary benefit from the
property.32 Emphasizing that the relationship between plaintiff and defendants
was that of lessee and lessor of the self-storage unit, the court found the insureds
did not have physical possession of the plaintiff's property stored in the unit, nor
did the insureds have any proprietary interest in or receive any benefit from
plaintiff's personal property.33 The insureds received benefit from the lease of
criticized as "unnecessary dictum" in a concurring opinion. Id. at 1022 (Kimball, J., concurring).
On rehearing, the court emphasized that the decision only reverses the summary judgment and "does
not preclude the litigation of any issue of law or fact between the parties." Id. at 1023.
29. Washington, 634 So. 2d at 1179-80. See also Wallace v. Weavers Underwriting Agency, 633
So. 2d 857 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 1068 (1994) (holding that after notice of a
claim, correction of self-insured retention in excess policy from $10,000 to $2,500,000 was
ineffective). Cf. Faucheaux v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 633 So. 2d 959 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
granted in part sub nom. Louque v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 642 So. 2d 858 (1994). The sheriff
of St. Charles Parish applied for a $500,000 policy issued through Louisiana Automobile Insurance
Plan (LAIP). In the application, he executed a rejectibn of UM coverage in proper form. LAIP
issued a policy for $350,000. its maximum coverage except when greater limits are required by law.
When the error was noted, the sheriff provided necessary documentation, and the insurer issued an
endorsement increasing the limits to $500,000. The policy was renewed thereafter and was in effect
when the plaintiffs were injured while passengers in a sheriff's vehicle. Id. at 961. In a plurality
opinion, the court held that, since the endorsement increasing policy limits was neither a substitute
policy nor a reinstatement, a new waiver was necessary in connection with the increase in policy
limits. Id. at 963-65. One judge concurred in the reversal of summary judgment because issues of
intent and motive were involved. Id. at 965 (Kliebert, C.J., concurring in part). Two judges
dissented on the ground the endorsement was nothing more than a correction of an error, with
$500,000 UM limits having been properly waived in the original application, Id. at 965-66
(Cannella, J., dissenting).
30. 634 So. 2d 1180 (La. 1994).
31. Id. at 1182.
32. See, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. Howard Trucking Co., 454 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1983); Hendrix Elec.
Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 297 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 1184-85.
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the storage unit itself, not from the plaintiff's personal property stored in the unit.
Therefore, the "care, custody, or control" exclusion was not applicable.34
VII. DIRECT ACTION STATUTE
Careful judicial attention to the scope of the Louisiana Direct Action
Statute 31 continues. Ever since the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Quinlan v' Liberty Bank and Trust Co.36 in 1990, the appellate courts have
struggled to ascertain the proper interpretation of the Louisiana Direct Action
Statute, particularly with reference to so-called indemnity policies. 37 The core
of the debate, of course, is whether a policy characterized as an indemnity policy
by the issuer might nonetheless qualify as a liability policy under the statute,
permitting a direct action to be brought.
The Quinlan decision has been discussed in this forum on two separate
occasions. 38  As a general proposition, the opinion interpreted Louisiana
Revised Statutes 22:655 to mean that since there is no definition of "indemnity
insurance" in the Insurance Code, the statute should be deemed to apply to
claims for personal injury and for corporeal property damage regardless of the
characterization given to the policy by the insurer. If the claim is for incorporeal
property damage, however, there should be no direct action unless the policy is
deemed to be ambiguous as to whether it was intended to be an indemnity policy
or a liability policy.
In a prescient concurrence, Justice Hall observed that the distinction between
corporeal property damage and incorporeal property damage does not find a
place in the statute and noted that there appeared to be no policy reason for the
distinction. 39 During this term, the Louisiana Supreme Court returned to the
issue and eliminated the distinction in an opinion that Justice Hall joined.
The opinion in question is Black v. First City Bank.* The plaintiff was a
physician whose former office manager had forged endorsements on checks
34. Id. at 1185.
35. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
36. 575 So. 2d 336 (La. 1990).
37. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Lustig, 975 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1992); State v. Acadia
Parish Police Jury, 631 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994). In Acadia Parish Police Jury, a police
jury third-partied one of its contracting agencies and its insurer in litigation in which the State was
seeking reimbursement from the police jury for allegedly false invoices submitted to the State for
payment. Id. at 613. The court interpreted Quinlan to deny a right of direct action against an
indemnity policy when the loss was of an incorporeal and the policy was unambiguous. The court
held a claim for monetary reimbursement was one for an incorporeal and the policy was
unambiguous; therefore, the right of direct action was denied. Id. at 613-14.
38. W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, Insurance, Developments in the Law, 1990.1991,
52 La. L. Rev. 527, 531-34 (1992); W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson. Insurance,
Developments in the Law, 1989.1990, 51 La. L. Rev. 249, 254-56 (1990).
39. Quinlan, 575 So. 2d at 355 (Hall. J., concurring).
40. 642 So. 2d 151 (La. 1994).
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made payable to the physician and deposited them to her credit at the defendant
bank. When this scheme was discovered, the plaintiff sued the bank for a sum
exceeding $200,000. The bank was later declared insolvent and the FDIC was
substituted as a party defendant; however, it was later dismissed and the bank's
insurer was added as a defendant. The insurer interposed an exception of no
right of action based on Quinlan, arguing that its policy was an indemnity policy
which unambiguously denied any defense obligation and that the claim was for
the loss of incorporeal property. Both lower courts, no doubt believing the
insurer had properly brought itself within the exception announced in Quinlan,
sided with the insurer.4'
However, four justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court joined in an opinion
which reversed the lower courts. 2 While the majority announced that the
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal loss is "inconsistent with the
remedial purpose of the Direct Action Statute,' '13 the actual holding appears to
be that the policy before the court was a liability policy rather than an indemnity
policy. The majority examined the type of conduct being alleged and concluded
the policy intended to cover loss occasioned during the existence of the policy
by, inter alia, the giving of credit on forged instruments. The court may well
have been moved toward the conclusion it reached by the observation that
escaping liability as an insurer when the insured becomes bankrupt "is one of the
exact evils sought to be prohibited by the Direct Action Statute.""
While the holding certainly indicates the supreme court intends to construe
"liability insurance" broadly and thus to recognize a broad right to a direct action
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:655, the opinion does not entirely remove
doubt that certain types of insurance policies might fall outside the Louisiana
Direct Action Statute. Reduced to its essentials, the holding is that if a policy
is deemed to be a liability policy (and perhaps the court intends to determine in
the future that all policies which would pay for a tort-based loss are liability
policies), then even a claim for incorporeal loss may be made in a direct action.
If it is still possible that a given policy might be one that is unambiguously an
indemnity policy, is it not still possible that no direct action is available? Black
would, in that event, be distinguishable on the ground that it spoke to a liability
policy, not an indemnity policy. One has the distinct impression that this general
subject matter is by no means closed.
There were two other decisions of note involving the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute. In Foret v. Terrebonne Towing Co.,, 5 the Louisiana First
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. The precise alignment is somewhat confusing. Justices Watson, Hall, and Calogero signed
the opinion with qualification. Justice Ortique signed the opinion but also wrote that he concurred
"in the result." Justice ad hoc Shortess noted his concurrence but did not sign the opinion. Justices
Marcus and Kimball dissented and assigned reasons.
43. Black, 642 So. 2d at 154.
44. Id. See generally McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 26, § 22, at 22-23.
45. 632 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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Circuit Court of Appeal followed Grubbs v. Gulf International Marine, Inc.,46
in holding a direct action is available against a marine protection and indemnity
insurer. During the prior term, the supreme court had resolved this question,
which had long troubled both the state and federal court systems, in favor of
granting a direct action. Grubbs was discussed in this forum last year. 7
Finally, of Cohen v. Cohen48 it may be said that the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute is significant by its omission. Plaintiff was a guest passenger in
a car driven by his daughter. They were both Louisiana domiciliaries, but were
injured in an accident in Vermont. The allegedly faulty driver was a Canadian
citizen employed by a Canadian company and insured by a Canadian insurer.
Suit was brought in Louisiana against the Canadian entities as well as the
daughter and her insurers. The Canadian employer and insurer filed exceptions
of lack of personal jurisdiction, which were denied by the trial court.4 9
The appellate court, however, granted a writ and reversed the trial court,
dismissing the action as to the employer and its insurer.' Based on the facts
summarized in the opinion, this seems clearly correct. The court was also
correct in avoiding the temptation to find personal jurisdiction is somehow
granted by the Louisiana Direct Action Statute. This is an error sometimes
made, but clearly the fact that Louisiana might permit a liability insurer to be
sued directly has nothing at all to do with whether its courts may exercise
personal jurisdiction over that insurer to permit such an action to be brought.5 1
VIII. LIFE INSURANCE AND HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
There have been no decisions of particular note on the subject of life
insurance during this past term. And, for all of the furor being created in the
federal and state legislative halls by the general subject of health insurance, it is
remarkable that there were very few judicial opinions of note on that subject
either. To be precise, there were two; and one of them has much more to do
with the concept of subrogation itself than with health insurance.
In the first of these, Perault v. Time Insurance Co.,s2 the court, to assure
coverage, gave a rather strained interpretation to a pre-existing condition clause.
The insured had undergone a routine gynecological examination in April, 1987,
during which her physician detected a small "nodule" on her thyroid gland. She
was so informed, and the physician suggested that she have a thyroid scan to
determine the nature of that growth. She told the physician she was unsure
46. 625 So. 2d 495 (La. 1993).
47. W. Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, Insurance, Developments in the Law, 1992-1993,
54 La. L. Rev. 651, 658-61 (1994).
48. 635 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 1295.
50. Id. at 1296.
51. See McKenzie & Johnson, supra note 26, § 23, at 31-38.
52. 633 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writs denied, 634 So. 2d 833. 834 (1994).
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about coverage for such a procedure under her insurance, and the physician's
records did not reflect any further discussion on the subject."
In any event, the patient apparently did nothing about the nodule at that
time. She did consult another physician in November, 1987, with symptoms of
fatigue, weakness, and headaches. He either did not detect the nodule, or if he
did, said nothing to her about it.
54
In August, 1988, the patient applied for the insurance that was to become the
focus of the later litigation. Among the questions on the application, she was
asked to say whether she had ever had any diagnosis or treatment of "diabetes,
high or low blood sugar or any disorder of the thyroid gland" or of "cancer,
tumor, cyst or growth of any kind." She answered in the negative to both
questions.55
Finally, in March, 1989, she returned to the first physician for another
routine gynecological examination. He examined the thyroid; found the nodule
had increased in size; and made an appointment for her to undergo a thyroid
scan. The scan determined the nodule was malignant, and ultimately the thyroid
gland was surgically removed. When the insurer denied her claim for medical
expenses, the patient sued. The trial court awarded the medical expenses but
denied the patient's request for penalties and attorney's fees. Both sides
appealed.56
The appellate court first determined that the negative answer to the first
pertinent inquiry on the application was not false, on the ground that no one told
the patient the nodule should be considered a "disorder of the thyroid gland. ' 57
While this was in itself a dubious conclusion, it was of no moment to the
decision, since the court determined her negative answer to the second inquiry
was false. The court properly held she should have understood the inquiry about
a "cyst or growth of any kind" to include the nodule that she had discussed with
the first physician about sixteen months before she filled out the application for
health insurance. 58
Having thus determined the patient had made a false statement in her
application, the next issue was whether she had violated Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:619, the so-called anti-technical statute. As interpreted by Louisiana
courts, that statute bars a recovery under the policy only if the false statement
was made with "actual intent to deceive" and if it materially affects either the
acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer.59 The court held
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. As the careful student of Louisiana insurance law knows, La. R.S. 22:619 (1978 & Supp.
1994) actually states the test in the disjunctive; i.e., recovery will be barred if there is actual intent
to deceive or if the risk is materially affected. Long-standing jurisprudence,, however, has made the
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the insurer had not discharged its admittedly difficult burden of proof to satisfy
this statute. The court reasoned the plaintiff must not have thought the
information conveyed to her on the first visit about the nodule was significant,
because, with a family history of breast cancer, she would certainly have done
something about it if she thought it was." With all respect, the statute does not
mention anything about whether the applicant thinks the information is
significant; the significance should be a determination made by the insurer once
the information is provided.
With that determination made, however, the court then turned to the second
defense raised by the insurer-that its pre-existing condition clause should bar
any recovery. The court noted as it began its discussion that this defense, unlike
the misrepresentation defense, is a matter of contract interpretation6'-an
observation the court seemed then to forget when it turned to the statute at the
end of its analysis to resolve the question presented. The policy defined "pre-
existing condition" as a "condition not fully disclosed on the application for
insurance" for which the insured received medical treatment or advice from a
physician within the two years prior to the effective date of the policy. Rejecting
the trial court's determination that the pre-existing condition clause was
ambiguous, the appellate court nonetheless subjected the language to a very
peculiar interpretation.
The appellate court .reasoned that the policy made disclosure on the
application a condition for excluding coverage on the basis of a pre-existing
condition. Since this insured had not "disclosed" her condition, but rather had
concealed it without violating Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:619, the court
apparently concluded she did not fall within the prerequisite of having "not fully
disclosed" the condition.6"
There are two serious objections to this approach. The first is that it turns
the contractual language on its head. All the insurer said in the definition was
that, if a condition was "not fully disclosed" and had been treated within the
prior two years, it could be considered a pre-existing condition. Certainly the
existence of the nodule was "not fully disclosed"; it was concealed. And the
second is that the opinion seems to incorporate Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:619 into the pre-existing condition determination, implying that if lack of full
disclosure does not violate the statute, then it should not be considered a lack of
full disclosure for contractual purposes.
In reaching its conclusion, the court seemed to overlook the purpose of the
pre-existing condition exclusion. The insurer is entitled to know the nature of
disjunctive requirement a conjunctive one. See Coleman v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 645
(La. 1982); Ragan v. Pilgrim Life Ins. Co. of Am., 461 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ
denied, 464 So. 2d 315 (1985).
60. Perault v. Time Ins. Co., 633 So. 2d 263, 266 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writs denied, 634 So.
2d 833, 834 (1994).
61. id.
62. Id. at 267.
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the risk that it is assuming. If it is fully informed of the conditidn and decides
to insure nonetheless, then it should be bound by its agreement. The obvious
inference is that with most pre-existing conditions, the insurer will decline to
insure when given full knowledge of the situation. To say that it intended to
insure because the condition was concealed is, in effect, to write the clause as
probably intended out of the policy.
The other decision during this term, Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau
Casualty Insurance Co.,63 declined to extend the opinion in Aetna Insurance v.
Naquin64 to health insurance in a tort context. The claimant had been a guest
passenger in one of two vehicles involved in an automobile accident. He sued
both drivers, the owners of the vehicles, and their insurers. The claimant's own
health insurer paid for his medical expenses and then intervened in the litigation.
The health insurance policy apparently did not contain a standard conventional
subrogation clause, and thus the insurer had to proceed on a theory of legal
subrogation. 5 Under Louisiana Civil Code article 1829 as amended in 1984,
one of the instances in which legal subrogation may take place is "in favor of an
obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or for others and who has recourse
against those others as a result of the payment."6'
In Naquin, the property insurer of rental property was held to be entitled to
recover against a negligent roofing contractor for rain damage to the roof of the
property, even though the property insurer had no conventional subrogation
agreement to accompany its payment to its own insured. 6' The opinion in
Naquin relied on a discussion of legal subrogation in this forum some years
before the opinion, which had urged that the Louisiana Supreme Court clarify
earlier jurisprudence and hold that legal subrogation is available under such
circumstances.6
With very little discussion or analysis, the supreme court declined to extend the
Naquin rationale.69 The court denied that the health insurer was bound solidarily
63. 638 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1994).
64. 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986).
65. Martin, 638 So. 2d at 1068. The absence of a conventional subrogation clause, when there
was no apparent reason for the absence, probably affected the judicial approach to the case. Though
no court ever stated it so bluntly, surely some thought must have been given to the question: if the
insurer did not bother to protect itself through conventional subrogation, why should we expand our
prior decisions to give it relief?
66. The predecessor article seems identical in substance, but the wording was somewhat different:
"Subrogation takes place of right ... for the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for
others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it." La. Civ. Code art. 2161(3)
(1870). The Naquin decision was based upon this version of the concept. But if there is any
substantive distinction to be made between the old article and the new article, the court did not make
it in Martin. So far as the opinion reflects, the reason for the different result in the two cases is not
the difference in wording in the two articles.
67. Naquin, 488 So. 2d at 954.
68. H. Alston Johnson, Insurance, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Tenn, 39 La. L. Rev. 675 (1979).
69. "Naquin was a property damage exception to the general rule; the exception should not be
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with the tortfeasor for the medical expenses the insurer paid. The court contended
that in a case such as Naquin, an insurer "bound to repair the damage caused by a
tortfeasor is solidarily liable with the tortfeasor because both are obliged to the
same thing-repair of the tort damage."7 ° But the court concluded that "medical
insurers are not obligated to repair tort damages"; rather, they have contracted to
pay "stipulated medical expenses, regardless of whether there is a tortfeasor and
tort liability."'" Thus the medical insurer "pays its own debt, not that of the
tortfeasor, and the two are not obligated to the same thing.
72
This is clearly insupportable. In the first place, a property insurer is also bound
to pay stipulated damage to property, whether there is a tortfeasor or not.73 In
Naquin, the roof leaked. Whether it leaked from natural causes or from the
negligence of a roofer mattered not one whit in determining whether the insurer
was obligated to pay for the loss.
The same can be said for the medical expenses in Martin. Martin incurred
medical expenses. Whether they occurred because he was alone in his car and was
involved in a one-car accident, or because of the conduct of a tortfeasor, made no
difference in whether the expenses were reimbursable. The distinction made by the
court between "tort damages" in Naquin and "medical expenses" in Martin is
artificial. Where Mr. Martin is concerned, there are simply damages. He was hurt;
he needed medical care; he got medical care; someone has to pay for it. His
damages were neither "tort" damages nor "contractual" damages. They were
simply damages.
By virtue of their conduct, the tortfeasors were legally obligated to repair these
damages. By virtue of its contract with Martin, the insurer was legally obligated
to repair these damages. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude as the court
did, that the tortfeasors and the health insurer are not bound for the same thing
under well-established supreme court decisions. If the insurer had written a
conventional subrogation clause into its policy, it clearly would have been entitled
to recover from the tortfeasors. And yet this right was denied because it had not
done so.
extended to health and accident insurance." Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 638
So. 2d 1067 (La. 1994). The court referred to Chief Justice Dixon's dissent in Naquin. which is
characteristically pithy and apparently based on the proposition that no legal subrogation should occur
in either instance. Naquin, 488 So. 2d at 955 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting). However, the dissent does
not explain why one should differ from the other.
70. Martin, 638 So. 2d at 1069.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. While the opinion in Naquin is not entirely clear on the point, it is clear the court treated the
plaintiff insurer seeking reimbursement as if it were the property insurer of the owner, paying the loss
directly to the owner. It brushed aside the argument that since the money was paid to the tenants
under the owner's property insurance policy, there could be no subrogation. Properly, the court
understood the money could have been paid to the owner, who in turn would have paid it to the
tenants for the loss to their belongings. The court also understood the result should not have differed
in the two factual situations.
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If it is the supreme court's view that an insurer which could accomplish its
desired result by conventional subrogation should, as a matter of policy, be
denied that same legal result because it has omitted that clause from its policy,
the court should forthrightly say so rather than making puzzling distinctions in
the law of solidarity. One could then squarely debate the merits of such a
policy. One argument in favor of the policy is the apparent belief that it
prevents an insurer from paying less than the risk it undertook, while still
collecting a full premium, i.e., that it agreed to pay the full sum of the medical
expenses within stipulated limits but, by reimbursement, will be paying less than
the full sum. But if that result is unacceptable from a policy standpoint, then
conventional subrogation clauses should be prohibited altogether, which has not
been done.
The real issue is whether the Louisiana Civil Code envisions that the law
will, in some instances, supply a rule for governing the relationship of parties
which the parties could supply for themselves, but have not. Surely this is not
a startling proposition; this is precisely what occurs in sales, leases, and
conventional obligations generally.
Whether the recognition of legal subrogation in this setting will lower
premiums (as it should), because the net risk undertaken by the insurer is less,
is uncertain. As a practical matter, one could only know that after the
recognition of legal subrogation, since insurers do not predict risks but rather
react to risk history. It seems certain, however, that denying legal subrogation
will not decrease premiums. The author remains convinced that Naquin was a
correct decision; that there is no sound distinction between the types of insurance
for which legal subrogation is recognized; 7 that solidarity is present in both the
Naquin situation and the Martin situation; and that the court should have reached
the opposite conclusion in Martin.75
74. In addition to Naquin. many other Louisiana decisions recognize legal subrogation for
property insurers. See State Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Sykes, 527 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988);
Sentry Indem. Co. v. Rester, 430 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Volume Shoe Corp. v.
Armato, 341 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 132 So. 2d
240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). There are also cases recognizing legal subrogation for other forms of
first-party insurance. See Hellmers v. DOTD, 503 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 505
So. 2d 1141, 1149 (1987) (holding that an automobile carrier which had paid its insured sums under
property damage, medical pay, and accidental death coverages was legally subrogated.to rights of
insured against tortfeasor); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Byles, 280 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973) (holding an uninsured motorist carrier is legally subrogated to the rights of its insured
against an uninsured tortfeasor, when the carrier had paid losses to its insured caused by that
tortfeasor); John M. Walton, Inc. v. McManus, 67 So. 2d 130 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1953) (holding a
collision insurer is entitled to subrogation). On the authority of Naquin, one appellate court extended
legal subrogation to health insurance before the Martin opinion was rendered. Dietrich v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 509 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987). The court therein held a law firm, which arguably
failed to provide promised health insurance to an employee who was injured through fault of a
tortfeasor, would, if made to provide such benefits, be legally subrogated to the rights of the
employee, as tort victim against the tortfeasor, for payment of medical expenses. Id. at 51.
75. The decision this term in Kidder v. Boudreaux, 636 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), is
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IX. PROPERTY INSURANCE
It goes without saying that tenant misbehavior is one of the most troubling
concerns that landlords face. That means, in turn, that the property insurers of
landlords may have to deal with results of such misbehavior when it occurs.
Two cases during this term address the consequences of such misbehavior in
different factual situations.
In Sharplin v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,76 the insured had sold certain
business premises to the vendees under a credit deed. The insured thus held a
mortgage on the premises to secure payment of the full purchase price. The
vendees made certain presumably permanent improvements to the premises,
77
which arguably made them and their prospective value subject to the mortgage
as well. Eventually, the insured attempted to foreclose on the property because
of non-payment of the price, but was stymied by bankruptcy proceedings. When
the insured inspected the premises, he found many of these improvements had
been removed. He sued his property insurer for the value of the property,
alleging coverage under the "vandalism" clause. The policy defined vandalism
as "willful and malicious damage to, or destruction of the described property"
and made certain exclusions not pertinent to this discussion. 78
The trial court found the vendees had acted intentionally because of certain
sharp disagreements between them and the insured, and held there was coverage
under the policy. The appellate court, however, noted that the trial judge
continually referred to items "damaged or removed," and that the policy
addressed only damage or destruction. Reading the policy literally, the appellate
court held only those items proved to be damaged or destroyed were covered, not
those totally removed from the premises by the vendees.7 9
As a literal interpretation, this may be correct. But it does seem unfair to
the insured,, who may be puzzled by the result that his coverage apparently
depends upon the behavior of these miscreants. If they had smashed the central
air unit with a sledgehammer, there is coverage. But because they carefully
removed it (and perhaps are happily using it in some other location), there is no
coverage. In either event, the insured has lost its functional use and will have
not contrary. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. The tortfeasor was underinsured
with Farm Bureau, and the plaintiff also sought recovery from her uninsured motorist carrier, State
Farm, for a portion of her medical expenses. Farm Bureau sought and was granted a credit for the
portion of the medical expenses paid by State Farm. Id. at 284. It argued on appeal it was legally
subrogated to the rights of the victim because of the State Farm payment. Id. State Farm had not
asserted any subrogation rights, however, and the result of the trial court's granting of the credit was
to grant the tortfeasor (through his insurer) the benefit of a collateral source paid for by the victim.
76. 628 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 399 (1994).
77. The items were such things as a central air unit, light fixtures, a lock set from a door, water
heater and so on. id. at 218-19 n.2.
78. Id. at 219. The policy was apparently not an all-risk policy, so called, but rather was limited
to specific defined risks, which included "vandalism" as defined.
79. Id. at 220.
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to replace it if he wants cool air. This seems to slice the issue thinner than was
really necessary.
In the other decision,80 the tenant had not removed items or perhaps even
maliciously damaged the premises. He had undertaken some repairs and
"improvements" that the trial judge said it was an "understatement" to call
"disastrous." Basically, the tenant apparently trashed the premises under the
guise of improvement. The landlord had an all-risk policy and sought recovery
for the cost of restoring the premises to their pre-lease pristine character. The
insurer contended the damage was excluded under the provision of the policy
that declined coverage for "faulty, inadequate, or defective ... design,
specification, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, remodeling."'
The appellate court, as had the trial court, properly rejected the argument,
though its announced reason was one not specifically found in the policy. The
appellate court held the exclusion did not apply because the renovations were not
approved by the insured, in contravention of the lease.8 2 The policy apparently
did not mention approval of the insured nor adherence to the lease provisions,
so it might not have been entirely correct to base the decision on that point.
However, the trial judge's reasons, approved by the appellate court, probably
give a sounder basis for the result. She had concluded the intent of the exclusion
was to "prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to insuring the
quality of a contractual undertaking by the insured of someone authorized by
him."83  While this is still an issue of "approval" by the insured, it more
squarely addresses the point of intent of the exclusion. The trial judge seemed
to have the right view of the exclusion, and the appellate court was correct to
affirm her.
80. Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).
81. Id. at 311.
82. Id. at 312.
83. Id.
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